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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
It was conceded by the parties that during a fourth period of tume as
Assistant Director of the Department of Liquor Control respondent was
not actively engaged in the practice of law.
The court distinguished its holding in 1955 that a referee of the
Cleveland Mumcipal Court had not been actively engaged in the practice
of law on the ground that "since a Judge of the Cleveland Municipal
Court in the performance of his judicial duties can not, by statutory
definition, be considered as practicing law, then neither can services,
as a referee, in assisting a judge in the performance of judicial duties be
considered the practice of law."
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
Prohibition - Capacity to Bring Action -
Availability of Another Remedy
Last year's Survey' considered the unsuccessful effort of a plaintiff as
a -taxpayer to enjoin the Ohio State Racing Commission from expending
funds or issuing permits for the conducting of horse racing in Ohio.,
In that case it was held that in the absence of statutory authority, a tax-
payer lacks legal capacity to institute an action to enjoin the expenditure
of public funds, unless he has some special interest therein 'by reason of
which his own property rights are placed in jeopardy. Since petitioner
had not alleged that respondent was expending funds collected from tax-
payers generally, and did not claim to be among those special taxpayers
from whom Commission revenues were collected, and could point to no
special authorization by statute to hun to bring the action, he could not
succeed.
The same petitioner (and others) then 'brought an original action for
a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court3 against the Commission to
prohibit it from authorizing, permitting or issuing any pernts for con-
ducting horse racing for a stake, purse or award, with pari-mutuel or
certificate type of wagering, within the state. The principal basis of their
contention was the constitutional prohibition4 against lotteries of any
kind, and the alleged invalidity on that account of the statutory authority
of respondent Commission.5
The Supreme Court sustained respondents demurrer to the petition,
and two judges dissented.
' State ex rel. Flynn v. Board of Elections, 164 Ohio St. 193, 201, 129 N.E.2d 623,
628 (1955); 1955 Survey, 7 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 231 (1956)
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Conceding, apparently arguendo the quasi-judicial character of re-
spondent6 the court held, without specifying its reasons in any detail other
than to refer to the opinion an the 1954 injunction case, that petitioner
was not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of prohibition because he
had an adequate remedy at law by way of an injunction.
The key seems -to lie in the fact that the principal petitioner might
have succeeded in the original injunction action had he alleged some
"special interest" in the thing sought to be enjoined. Judge Taft asks,
without attempting to answer his own question, whether petitioner could
have held his position in court with an allegation that he was a "citizen."
He 'believes -that a majority of the court would have refused petitioner an
injunction even if he had so characterized himself. He recognizes peti-
tioner's dilemma, but can get only one other judge to recognize it, or,
perhaps, to be willing to do anything about it. -
It seems to this writer that a valid and important legal question is
presented. There is serious doubt, in view of the constitutional prohibi-
tion, of -the validity of the legislation creating the Racing Commission,
and of the pari-mutuel system.7 It ought to be resolved, whatever the
motives of this petitioner may be in seeking its resolution. It is safe to
hazard a guess that if he or someone else8 alleges that he is a patron of
the tote-machines, and therefore does -have an interest in the expenditure
by the Commission of Tevenues received therefrom, he will be told that
he has unclean hands and to go sit down in the back of the court room.
In his petition for a writ of prohibition he was careful to join as co-
relators the wife and children of a man who, it was alleged, had lost
money by wagering at one of the race tracks for which a permit had
been given by the respondent Commission. Of course, if relator lost be-
cause of the existence of an adequate remedy, then they, too, had an ade-
quate remedy in injunction. They could perhaps succeed on the ground
of reasonable apprehension of injury to their rights by alleging that if
1 1955 Survey, 7 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 237 (1956).
2 State ex rel. Masterson v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 162 Ohio St. 366, 123
N.E.2d 1 (1954).
'State ex rel. Masterson v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 164 Ohio St. 312, 130 N.E.
2d 829 (1955).
'OHio CoNsT. art. XV, § 6.
5 OHIo REv. CODE §§ 3769.01 et seq.
'See the remarks of Judge Taft, dissenting, at 164 Ohio St. 312, 317, 130 N.E.2d
829, 832 (1955).
7This is no moral judgment - only a legal one!
'Quaere: is petitioner now precluded by res ludicata from filing another injunction
action in common pleas in which he sues as a citizen or as an "interested" taxpayer?
He could have made those allegations in his first injunction petition.
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permits are granted the husband will put some more of the family's
sustenance on some horse and lose it.
Perhaps the next Survey will have Chapter 3 of this Ohio Judicial
Derby.
Counterclaims - Certification by Municipal
Court to Common Pleas Court
At early common law counterclaims were not permitted,9 but this
rule has been changed, and all systems of code pleading make substantial
provision for them in the interest of avoiding unnecessary litigation.' 0
A correlative problem occasioned by the recognition of counterclaims
is that which occurs when the plaintiffs claim is below the mimum
jurisdictional amount of a court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction, but the
defendant's claim, while the proper subject of a counterclaim, exceeds
that amount.
Since 1951 the Municipal Court Act" has made specific provision
for the certification by the municipal court of the entire controversy to
the common pleas court.'2  An unusual exception came to light in
Mann v. Sexton.13 Plaintiff sued in the Municipal Court of Dayton for
forcible entry and detainer with a second cause of action for a judgment
for rent due. Defendant answered and filed a counterclaim for reforma-
tion of his lease, with a second cause of action for money damages in
which the amount prayed for exceeded the $2,000.00 jurisdictional limit
of the court. The municipal court certified the entire matter to the
common pleas court, which promptly on motion, remanded the entire
proceedings back to municipal court for the reason that the common
pleas court does not have jurisdiction of forcible entry cases.14
Joinder of Parties United in Interest
Questions of proper joinder of parties are not commonly raised today,
as contrasted with their incidence at common law and in the early days
of the codes, but a rather unusual one did arise in the period covered by
this Survey.' 5 The situation was brought about by a lease executed by
SCLARK, CODE PLEADING 633, 634 (2d ed. 1947)1
oCLARK, op cit. supra note 9, at 635-638.
n OHio REv. CODE c. 1901.
SHIO REV. CODE § 1901.22 (E) Note, however, that the rule appears to be dif-
ferent with respect to counterdamins filed in the Cleveland Municipal Court. See
Oio REV. CODE § 1901.18 (I) (1)
"99 Ohio App. 47, 130 N.E.2d 866 (1955)
'
4 Clarkson Coal Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 23 F.2d 208, 210
(1927).
'Cleveland Trust Company v. Hart, 100 Ohio App. 66, 131 N.E.2d 841 (1955).
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five tenants in common, three of whom owned undivided one-fourth an-
terests and two of whom owned undivided one-eighth interests in the
leased real estate, to one of their members and a third person. Action
was brought by lessors for unpaid rent under the lease. Two of the five
lessors, one of whom was also one of the lessees, refused to join as plain-
tiffs and were made parties defendant.' 6
The defendants contended that the one tenant who occupied the posi-
tion of both a lessor and lessee, who Tefused to join as a plaintiff, and
who consequently was made a defendant, could not possibly be "united in
interest with those who seek a judgment against her."
The Court of Appeals of Summit County properly and promptly gave
short shrift to this scholastic argument, pointing out that this particular
reluctant party had acquired two separate and distinct statuses iby virtue
of her positions in the contract, and that while in that of lessee her in-
terests might have been in opposition -to those as lessor, she was certainly
united in interest with her fellow-lessors in the fulfillment of the contract,
regardless of the identity of the lessees. Therefore the joinder statute was
properly invoked.
Disqualification of Common Pleas Judges for
Bias - Mandamus Held Not to Enforce
The Supreme Court had before it in 1956 17 a question decided m a
per curiam opinion in 192218 - whether upon the filing of an affidavit
of bias, prejudice or other cause for disqualification of a common pleas
judge, by a party to an action pending before him, his removal by the
Chief Justice is mandatory or whether the fact of such disqualification
is to be inquired into by -the Chief Justice.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier ruling that the filing of the
affidavit does not bring about automatic iremoval, but that the Chief
Justice has the duty of passing upon the fact of such disqualification,
which determination will not 'be overruled by his fellow members except
for abuse by him of his discretion. Judges Taft and Stewart dissented,
arguing cogently that the disqualification is or ought to be mandatory.
Difficulty arises because of an apparent conflict between two pro-
"Oino REv. CoDE § 2307.20: "Parties who are united in interest must be joined
as plaintiffs or defendants. If the consent of one who should be joined as plaintiff
cannot be obtained and that fact is stated in the petition, he may be made a
defendant."
7 State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandr, Chief Justice, 164 Ohio St. 463, 132 N.E.2d 191
(1956).
' State ex rel. Chute v. Marshall, 105 Ohio St. 320, 137 N.E. 870 (1922)
"'When a judge of the court of common pleas is interested in a cause or matter
pending before the court, is related to, or has a bias or prejudice either for or against,
19571
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visions of the Revised Code. Section 2701.0319 enacted in 1913 pur-
suant to constitutional authority20 might appear to be in conflict with
section 141.08,21 enacted in 1917 The majority held that although
sections 2701.03 and 141.08 were enacted at different times they are %n
part iatera, and must be read and construed together; the Chief Justice
has in fact for over 40 years been hearing and passing upon such affi-
davits of bias and prejudice; to construe the language of section 2701.03
as requiring automatic disqualification of a judge upon the mere filing
of an affidavit would raise a serious question of constitutionality, in view
of the injunction of Article IV, section 3 that the Chief Justice shall pass
upon the disqualification; and the desirability of an interpretation which
would permit disqualification of a judge upon the mere filing of an
affidavit of prejudice, no matter how groundless, is doubtful.
Limitation of Actions - Credit on Note Does
Not Toll Statute on Mortgage
Defendant bought real estate from plaintiffs in 1923 and gave to
plaintiffs a purchase-money mortgage securing a note for the balance of
the purchase price. The note was due in 1926 and was not paid. The
last credit thereon was on August 6, 1932.
Plaintiffs instituted an action in ejectment against defendant on Au-
gust 3, 1953. This was more than 15 years after the last payment on the
note,22 but just short of the running of the 21-year statute on recovery of
tide to or possession of real property.
23
The plaintiff contended that the credit of August 6, 1932 on the note
a party to such matter or cause or to his counsel, or is otherwise disqualified to sit
in such cause or matter, on the filing of an affidavit by any party to such cause or
matter, or by the counsel of any party, setting forth the fact of such interest, bias,
prejudice or disqualification, the clerk of the court of common pleas shall enter the
fact of such filing on the trial docket in such cause and forthwith notify the chief
justice of the supreme court. The chief justice shall designate and assign some other
judge to take the place of the judge against whom such affidavit is filed. The judge
so assigned shall try such matter or cause. "
" OHIO CONST. art IV, § 3: "Any judge of the court of common pleas may tem-
porarily preside and hold court in any county; and until the general assembly shall
make adequate provision therefor, the chief justice of the supreme court of the state
shall pass upon the disqualification or disability of any judge of the court of com-
mon pleas, and he may assign any judge to any county to hold court therein."
' "The chief justice of the supreme court shall receive his actual and necessary ex-
penses incurred while performing his duties under the law and the constitution in
determining the disqualification or disability of any judge of the court of common
pleas or of the court of appeals.
= OHIo REv. CoDo 5 2305.06.
OHio Rnv. 0oDB 2305.04.
[Jtme
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1956
had the effect of tolling the statute on recovery of possession of realty.
The Supreme Court pointed out 4 that the only exceptions to the statute
of limitation on this action are minority, unsoundness of mind and im-
prisonment; that none of them applied here; that the provisions of Re-
vised Code section 2305.0825 will toll the statute on the money obligation
but not on the real property right, and that it does not by implication
toll the running of any other statute. Even if it did toll the running of
the statute on the real property right, it would toll it only to the extent
of 15 years, which would have required plaintiff to have sued in 1947
Limitation of Actions - General Appearance and
Failure to Raise Defense After Bar
In Russell v. Drake26 the Supreme Court had before it the question
whether a defendant, improperly served with summons while a minor,
could, after reaching majority during the pendency of the action, cure
such a defect in service by voluntarily entering his general appearance
and pleading to the merits. The court unanimiously held that he could.
Within the period provided by the applicable statute of limitations,
plaintiff commenced an action to recover damages for personal injury
from defendant, a minor. Summons was served upon him at his usual
place of residence. The fact of his minority was apparently unknown
to the plaintiff, and no service was attempted or made upon his guardian,
father or other proper person.27
During his minority, and after this defective service upon him, de-
fendant obtained two leaves to plead and then filed a general denial.
Subsequent to attaining his majority he filed a motion for a con-
tinuance of the case for 30 days. Thereafter and for the first time, he
attempted by a special appearance to obtain a dismissal of the action on
the ground of want of jurisdiction of the court over his person, because
of the defective service of summons, and because the cause of action had
been barred by the statute of limitations. It should be noted that -the
request for and grant of the 30-day continuance took place three days after
the running of the statute.
-LEastwood v. Capel, 164 Ohio St. 506, 132 N.E.2d 202 (1956). This case is also
discussed in the MORTGAGES section, infra.
' "If payment has been made upon any demand founded on a contract, or a written
acknowledgment thereof, or a promise to pay it has been made and signed by the
party to be charged, an action may be brought thereon within the time herein lim-
ited, (author's note: 15 years) after such payment, asknowledgment or promise."
164 Ohio St. 520, 132 N.E.2d 467 (1956)
270-1O REv. CoDE § 2703.13.
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The Supreme Court held that his motion for a continuance after at-
taining his majority constituted a general appearance, since it was an
act other than an objection to the court's jurisdiction over his person.
This cured the defective service of process at a time when he was capa-
ble of waiving his rights.
The court then decided that his motion to dismiss, even if treated as
a special demurrer, was not sufficient to raise the bar of the statute,
since the defect complained of did not appear on the face of the petition.28
Defendant never amended his answer to set up the bar as a special, af-
firmative defense, but went to trial on his general demal. He therefore
waived it.
The following three rules may be deduced from the case:
1. A minor may, after attaining his majority, by a general appearance
waive a defective service of process made upon him during
minority.
2. The running of the statute of limitations against the obligation
of the minor may be waived by him after his majority is reached,
by his failure to raise it in the two methods provided.
3. The courts will not treat filing dates or docket entries as defects
appearing on the face of pleadings so as to permit the special
demurrer of limitation of actions to be raised with respect to
them.
Limitation of Actions - Commencement Of
Action and Service on a Minor
If the statute of limitations is correctly raised, it will avail a minor de-
fendant. In Lehman v. Hornng2e the Court of Appeals for Crawford
County held that when the minor defendant in an action for personal m-
juries was neither named correctly in the petition filed against him, nor
served with a summons on an amended petition, for more than two years
from the date of the alleged action, no suit had been commenced or at-
tempted to be commenced against him within the time provided by the
statute.
3 0
' There is a good question whether court will take judicial notice of the filing date
and other docket entries as to tune, which do not, strictly appear on the face of
pleadings, so as to make this special demurrer available. See 36 YALE L. J. 914,
918-21 (1927); but see an inferential notation by the court of the filing date stamp
in Ulmer v. Honeywell, 113 N.E.2d 143 (Ohio App. 1952).
"100 Ohio App. 19, 135 N.E.2d 475 (1955)
31 OHIo REv. CODE § 2305.10.
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Limitation of Actions - False Arrest
And False Imprisonment
The Court of Appeals for Franklin County held in an opinion ap-
pearing during the period covered by this Survey31 that an action for
"false arrest" is similar to one for "false imprisonment." Thus the one-
year statute of limitations3 2 applies to it, rather than the four-year stat-
ute33 for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on contract nor
enumerated in sections 2305.10 to 2305.12, 2305.14 and 1307.08 of the
Revised Code. The holding appears correct, for basically false arrest and
false imprisonment as causes of action are indistinguishable except in the
manner in which they arise.34
Executions - May Not be Levied Without
Specific Money Judgment
The Supreme Court resolved a question in 1956 which had not pre-
viously got beyond lower court level It held in Roach v. Roach35 that a
decree of a divorce court for installment payments for support is not
per se a judgment upon which an execution may properly issue. The
statute providing for the writ of execution must be strictly construed
and followed.36 Strict construction of it requires that such an order, in-
duding past due installments, must be reduced to a lump sum judg-
ment, in order to have execution -thereon. Judge Taft dissented, urging
that the result reached was directly contrary -to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Piatt v Piatt.3 7
Sufficient Pleading of "Facts" In A
Petition for Divorce
Some lawyers, and particularly those of us who teach pleading and
have an honest and chaste love for our mother tongue, are wont to
Alter v. Paul, 135 N.E.2d 73 (Ohio App. 1955)
'
2 OHio REV. CODE § 2305.11.
'3OHio REV. CODE § 2305.09.
" For a case involving proper pleading of a cause in false imprisonment (arrest) see
McCoy v. Baer, 136 N.X.2d 66 (Ohio App. 1955), discussed in this Survey at page
263.
5 164 Ohio St. 587, 132 N.E.2d 742 (1956)
c' OHio RFv. CODE § 2329.09" '"The writ of execution against the property of the
judgment debtor issuing from a court of record, shall command the officer to whom
it is directed, to levy on the goods and chattels of the debtor. The exact amount of
the debt, damages and costs, for which the judgment is entered, shall be endorsed
on the execution." (Emphasis supplied).
'9 Ohio 37 (1839).
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mourn the death of pleading as a fine art. We would not go back
to the common law days of special traverses and the like. But it seems to
some of us that too few lawyers in drawing their pleadings today are
mindful of the niceties of legal prose.3 8  When he was on the common
pleas bench in Madison County, Judge Bell showed himself to be a stick-
ler for proper pleading, and did his best to put an end to the pernicious
practice of plaintiffs' lawyers in characterizing a state of acts of negligence
on the part of the defendant by the custom and expedient, unwarranted
though it might have been, of repeating the facts already pleaded and
then embroidering them by saying, "The defendant was negligent in the
following respects and particulars. ,,39
Since his election to the Supreme Court, Judge Bell has apparently
been doing some quiet evangelizing among brethren on that bench, and
he is making converts. In Dansby vt. Dansby4 ° the plaintiff's petition for
divorce, after alleging the facts of residence and marriage, purported to
set out "two causes of action"4 1 as follows:
plaintiff states willful absence of the defendant for one year.
For her second cause of action plantiff says that the defendant has
been guilty of gross neglect of duty.
Defendant filed a motion to require plaintiff to make her petition
definite and certain, which motion the trial court overruled. Defendant
then demurred to the petition for the reason that it did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, which demurrer was also over-
ruled.
On appeal the Supreme Court, with Judge Bell writing the unanimous
opinion, conceded that this practice among attorneys of simply alleging
the statutory grounds in the words of the statute has become prevalent.
The court appeared willing to follow precedent at the court of appeals
level to the effect that such a statement is good against general de-
murrer.42 But it held that such allegations are not sufficient in the face
of a motion to require definiteness and certainty.
'For an example of the trap in which a lawyer found himself as a result of his use
of the forbidden hybrid general-specific denial, see Hermanies v. Standard Oil Co.,
131 N.E.2d 233 (Ohio App. 1955)
'See Brown v. Pollard, 112 N.E.2d 692 (Ohio C. P. 1953). If the facts pleaded
constitute or may coasutute actionable negligence, the judge will so charge the jury.
If they do not constitute negligence, then plaintiff's pleading that they do adds noth-
ing to his case and can only prejudice the defendant's rights in the minds of the
jury. The code requires the pleading of facts and not law. OrIo REv. CODE 5
2309.04.
"0165 Ohio St. 112, 133 N.E.2d 358, 359 (1956).
'Actually these are grounds for divorce, not causes of action. See OHIo REv CODE
§ 3105.10; Hanna v. Hanna, 114 N.E.2d 133 (Ohio App. 1952)
'Seibel v. Seibel, 30 Ohio App. 198, 164 N.E. 648 (1927); Kelley v. Kelley, 74
Untie
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A defendant in a divorce case, as in any other case, is entitled to
know the facts upon which the action is based. Such an abbreviated and
inartistic pleading as the mere statement of statutory grounds does not
so advise him and constitutes an open invitation to him to demur or
move to make defimte and certain. And thus the door is opened to
greater justification for the often made criticism of "too much delay in
the law."42a
The court distinguished Porter v. Lerch43 on the ground that the
sufficiency of the evidence and not the pleadings was the issue before it
in that case.
To Judge Bell we say, "Long Life!"
Sufficient Pleading in False Imprisonment Action
We do concede that it is sometimes difficult to draw the line between
what is a statement of fact and a conclusion of law, and between an ulti-
mate fact and a purely evidentiary one. In McCoy v. Baer" the Court
of Appeals for Franklin County gives us a valuable opinion upon what
allegations45 m an action for false imprisonment are necessary to stand
against a general demurrer, together with other authorities so holding.
The Law of the Case
The ghost of "The Law of the Case," which was the subject of com-
ment in the 1955 Survey, was seen again in 1956.46 It was only a brief
glimpse, but enough to convince observers that like Denmark's King, it
is "doomed for a certain term to walk the night."74
Validity of Judicial Sales - Failure to Comply
With Notice to Defendant - Rights of Owner
Of Property Sold
When a defendant cannot be served within the bounds of a court's
jurisdiction, the law provides the remedy of attachment whereby the
Ohio App. 225, 57 N.E.2d 791 (1944); Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 118 N.E.2d 845
(Ohio App. 1954) It should not be sufficient. A conclusion of law is not a
statement of facts.
'aDansby v. Dansby, 165 Ohio St. 112, 114, 133 N.B.2d 358, 360 (1956).
129 Ohio St. 47, 193 N.E. 766 (1934).
"136 N.E.2d 66 (Ohio App. 1955).
"Plaintiff says that defendant did unlawfully order and procure the arrest
of plaintiff by the police of Columbus, Ohio, without warrant of law or any lawful
process of any court or tribunal, forcibly and against the will of plaintiff and without
reasonable or probable cause, in the presence of divers and sundry good people;
that plaintiff was confined in the city prison deprived of her liberty for about
two hours before being exonerated from said false charges."
"Gottfried v. Yocum, 133 N.E.2d 389, 391 (Ohio App. 1953); See 1955 Survey,
7 WFsT. RFs. L. RAe. 241 (1956).
' "Hamlet" I. v. 10.
19571
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW[
plaintiff may reach the defendant's property which is found therein, in
order that it may in part at least satisfy the plaintiff's personal claims
against the defendant.48  The action is, of course, not changed in its in-
herent nature by reason of the resort to defendant's property as a means
of making up for the inability to reach his person; the action remains one
-n personam in its nature, but a quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over his prop-
erty is asserted by the court.
One of the problems which arises is that of the nature of the title
which a purchaser obtains at sheriff's sale of the goods attached and sold
to satisfy the plaintiff's judgment. It seems fairly well settled that he
gets no more than the judgment-defendant had to give, as distinguished
from the case in which plaintiff's action is one purely it; rem. 9 As far
as the defendant is concerned, however, Ohio statutes attempt to cut off
any of his rights once the property comes into the hands, through judi-
cial sale, of a purchaser in good faith.50
Not every judicial sale, however regular on its face, will afford this
protection to a purchaser against recovery of the property by its former
owner when he learns of what has happened in his absence. In Lenz v.
Frank,51 involving a foreclosure for delinquent real estate taxes, the sheriff
purported to have served the property owner at her usual place of resi-
dence, although in fact she had become ill and at the time of attempted
residence service was actually living elsewhere. Despite several subse-
quent transfers of the real estate to other good faith purchasers, and sub-
stantial improvements in the property by them, the court permitted the
foreclosed owner in an independent, collateral attack 52 on the foreclosure
decree to recover the property upon tender of the delinquent taxes, court
costs, value of the subsequent improvements and interest. It distinguished
Moor v. Parsons on the basis that in that case the defendant who had lost
his property was seeking to recover it under the provisions of the statutes
providing for relief after judgment,53 and could not get around section
11633, Ohio General Code,54 whereas Mrs. Lenz had never been before
"OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2715.01-2715.56.
"Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 65 (1847)
5o OHIO REV. CODE § 2325.03; Moor v. Parsons, 98 Ohio St. 233, 120 N.E. 305
(1918)
"' 152 Ohio St. 153, 87 N.E.2d 578 (1949)
" The Supreme Court erroneously called it a direct attack, on the ground that it was
based upon a complete lack of jurisdiction of the original trial court over the person
of the defendant, due to the fact that the place where service was left was not her
usual place of residence. But see BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 327 (4th ed. 1951).
It would seem that a direct attack can only be one made in the original case by ap-
peal, error, certiorari or other attempt to set aside the court's judgment or decree.
13OHio REv. CODE §§ 2325.01-2325.22.
14Now OHIO REV. CODE § 2325.03.
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the court due to want of jurisdiction over her person 55 and was, in effect,
not seeking relief under the statutory procedure. In neither case did the
sheriff's return or its equivalent, indicate that the defendant was not be-
fore the court.
With this lengthy but necessary preliminary explanation, we come to
the 1956 case.56 Plaintiff filed against nonresident defendants an action
for declaratory judgment terminating a lease and to recover advance rent
paid under the lease. Plaintiff filed an affidavit for service by publica-
tion in proper form, but no marked copy thereof was ever mailed to the
defendants at the address set forth in the affidavit, nor was any entry that
such had been done, as is required by statute,57 ever filed on the appear-
ance docket. Defendants did not appear and a default judgment was en-
tered against them. Subsequently the lots attached by plaintiff were sold
at sheriff's sale to plaintiff. It later sold them to a third person, the ap-
pellee in the case before the Supreme Court.
The court correctly held that the defendants could appeal, as a final
order, the common pleas court's refusal to vacate and set aside the sale of
the real estate holding, in effect, that the judgment of the trial court in
the first case was void ab %nito, and not merely voidable, for want of
jurisdiction over the deft-ndants and their property.
Of course, the decision is only on the appealability of the trial court's
judgment in the petition to vacate. But its applicability to the substantive
law of jurisdictional requirements cannot be escaped. To the writer it
seems to have this result: sections 2325.01 et seq. of the Revised Code
are coming to be held to apply to and provide for the vacation and modi-
fication of judgments which are voidable only, and not to those which
are void ab %nto. Defects in service of process may well render them
void ab mto, in which case resort to the statutory provisions for relief
after judgment is not necessary. A mere motion to quash may suffice.
No tune limit is per se involved, and an innocent purchaser is not pro-
tected, even by the record upon which he must almost of necessity rely.58
Who May Attack a Judgment Collaterally
In Plater v. Jefferson59 plaintiff, aready divorced from defendant,
'Nobody said anything about the fact that a personal judgment may not be ren-
dered in Ohio for delinquent real estate taxes. See 1943 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio) 89.
'Lincoln Tavern, Inc. v. Snader, 165 Ohio St. 61, 133 N.E.2d 606 (1956).
SOmo REv. CODE § 2703.16.
t In Lincoln Tavern v. Snader, the purchaser from the judgment creditor could have
by careful checking observed the defect in service as shown by the appearance docket
entry. In Lenz v. Frank and Moor v. Parsons he could not. They were determinable
only from evidence dehors any court record. See Judge Taft's dissents in Lenz and
Lincoln Tavern.
' 136 N.E.2d 111 (Ohio App. 1956).
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prayed that a divorce decree obtained by defendant from her previous
husband be vacated, and that defendant be restrained from enforcing an
alimony order which she had obtained against plaintiff in her divorce
action against him. The gist of plaintiff's complaint was that his erst-
while spouse had, while living in a meretricious relationship with him,
filed divorce proceedings against her first husband, as part of a fraudulent
scheme on -her part to be free of husband number one, so as to be able to
claim a common law marriage with plaintiff, to sue plaintiff for divorce
and alimony and to procure a large alimony award, in all of which de-
fendant apparently succeeded all too well to suit plaintiff.
The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals correctly held that -the judg-
ments complained of were regular on their face, were each entered by a
court having jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action and of the
parties, were unmodified and unreversed, and not open to attack col-
laterally. Quoting Freeman on Judgments, 60 the court held that only
those strangers who, if the judgments were given full effect, would be
prejudiced in Tegard to some pre-exisang rtght, may thus impeach it.
Plaintiff had in his petition no allegations which averred prejudice to any
rights which he had prior to his wife's divorce from her first husband.0 '
Some Further Problems in Jurisdiction
Settled during 1956,62 insofar as Ohio is concerned,63 was the ques-
tion whether a divorce court of this state which has jurisdiction of the
person of the defendant in an original divorce action, wherein the sup-
port of minor children is involved, retains jurisdiction over such de-
fendant after a divorce decree and an order for the support of minor chil-
dren are entered, so as to permit further orders for support to be made
against such defendant, even though he has since become a nonresident
of the state. In this case a copy of a motion made after term, seeking
an order to increase child support, and a notice of the time of hearing
of such motion were mailed to the nonresident defendant at his address
in another state and were received by him in ample time to be present
at the hearing.
Basing its holding on the premises that a court in which a decree of
divorce is rendered has continuing jurisdiction even without expressly
'§ 319 (5th ed. 1925)
'Except, perhaps, not to have married her, and they can hardly be said to be preju-
diced by enforcement of that judgment.
"Van Divort v. Van Divort, 165 Ohio St. 141, 134 N.E.2d 715 (1956), affirming,
137 N.E.2d 684 (Ohio App. 1955) The decision is also considered in the Do-
MIESTIC RELATIONS section, mnfra.
' Cumulative motions table in 134 N.E.2d indicates rehearing denied.
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reserving it, over matters relating to the custody, care and support of
minor children of the parties,64 and that an application to change or
modify alimony or support money is but incidental to the original suit
and not the institution of a new or original action, the party under a
support order is subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court
im that regard, "without reference to the place of his residence or further
steps to acquire jurisdiction of his person."
If this is true (and it seems that it should be even under our system
of separate state jurisdictions) the only remaining question would be
that of the due process of the notice. 5 In this instance no express
statutory provisions are found, but the Court of Common Pleas of Frank-
En County had adopted a rule of court "providing for the service of
writs or process by mail pursuant to, in accordance with and to the ex-
tent permitted 'by section 11297-1, General Code."66 The court held
that compliance with it and receipt by the husband of actual notice was
sufficient.
The same court on the same day also held6" that a nonresident un-
married mother could maintain bastardy proceedings for the support of
her child against a resident putative father, notwithstanding the fact
that the child was begotten and 'born in another state, and that neither
child nor mother had ever resided in Ohio. The action is essentially a civil
action for a 'tort of a transitory nature. The statutes giving the right in
Ohio to 'bring the action 8 do not limit that right to a woman resident
within the state. The better view is that such proceedings are transitory
in their nature. To hold otherwise might make Ohio a refuge for
fathers of bastard children.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Clark County held that an action
arising out of the collision of motor vehicles owned by plaintiff and de-
fendants which occurred within the confines of Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, a federal military reservation, is transitory and may be
brought wherever 'the alleged wrongdoer may be found and jurisdiction
obtained.69
" Corbett v. Corbett, 123 Ohio St. 76, 174 N.E. 10 (1930).
'See Walker v. City of Hutcbison, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) and Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
Now OHio REv. CODE § 2703.23.
Yuin v. Hilton, 165 Ohio St. 164, 134 N.E.2d 719 (1956) The case is also dis-
cussed in the DoMESTic RELATiONs secuon, snfra.
13Omio REV. CODE §§ 3111.01 et seq.
'May v. Lyons and Sams, 135 N.E.2d 631 (Ohio App. 1954)
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Service of Process - Demand in Garnishment
The Court of Appeals for Trumbull County held in Strock v. Kojick70
that service of a written demand on a judgment debtor in proceedings to
garnish earnings, by sending the same to him by ordinary mail was
proper. It was received -by the debtor in ample tune and was proper in
form. He contended that this did not comply with the requirements of
the statute.7 1 The court held that since the United States mail is the
agent of the sender this constituted a delivery to the debtor, or a deposit of
it at his residence, when he concedes that he did get it.
Procedure in Divorce Cases - Trial Judge Must
Hear Entire Case
It has long been held in Ohio 72 that because of the statutory require-
ment that the court73 of common pleas shall hear any of the causes for
divorce charged in the petition, the judge may not refer the issues of fact
and law to a referee for findings and decision. In Perry v Perry74 the
Court of Appeals for Pickaway County reversed and remanded a case in
which Judge Raddiff75 of Pickaway County heard the plaintiff and several
of her witnesses, then stated to counsel that he would be unable to hear
the remaining witnesses for a period of about one month. Plaintiff insisted
that the hearing be postponed until His Honor could finish the case.
Defendant insisted that it be finished at an earlier date. His Honor
obliged the wrong party, which resulted in the assignment of a common
pleas judge for a neighboring county, who heard the rest of the case. A
transcript of the testimony of the witnesses heard by the second judge was
made and read by Judge Radcliff and he made the decision and signed the
decree.
The court of appeals held, and it must be conceded to be correct,
that the second judge had acted only as a referee, that the judge who
granted the decree had not personally heard the defendant and many of
the witnesses, and that even the consent of the defendant to the procedure
could not cure the error.
70 136 N.E.2d 145 (Ohio App. 1955)
1 OHIO REv. CODE § 1911.40: "Such demand shall be made by delivering such
demand to the debtor personally, or by leaving such demand at, or by sending such
demand by registered letter to the debtor's usual place of residence."
" State ex rel. Kleinman v. Cleveland, 118 Ohio St. 536, 161 N.E. 918 (1928)
?OHIO REV. CODE § 3105.10.
' 100 Ohio App. 15, 135 N.E.2d 427 (1955)
'The author of this survey article feels safe in mentioning names, since the author
of the error is an old friend from Army days.
[June
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A Motion Is Not a Pleading
The Ohio Revised Code provides for only sm pleadings.76 While a
court will sometimes construe what the pleader calls a motion as a de-
murrer if the intent to demur is obvious, 77 it should not recognize it as
one of the three fact-stating pleadings. In Poe v Poe7" defendant filed
a motion -to dismiss plaintiff's divorce petition on the ground that there
had been condonation since the filing of plaintiff's petition. The court
heard evidence on the motion, over plaintiff's objections, and dismissed
plaintiff's petition.
The Court of Appeals for Auglaize County reversed and remanded.
Condonation is an affirmative defense in a divorce action and must be
affirmatively pleaded.79 But a motion (in this case not even verified)
is not a pleading and cannot ordinarily be used to dispose of the merits of
a case.
Venue of Actions Against State Officials
Plaintiff as prosecuting attorney of Fulton County brought an action
in its common pleas court against certain state officials, to wit, the Audi-
tor, Treasurer and Director of Finance, alleging in substance numerous
overcharges and collections by them and their official predecessors for
many years for the support of inmates in state institutions for the feeble-
minded who had been committed from Fulton County. He also joined
as defendants certain officials of Fulton County, to wit, the Treasurer,
Auditor and Clerk of Common Pleas Court, on the basis that they would,
if not restrained thereform, "issue warrants, pay and permit to be paid
further and additional sums of money" from the county funds to the
state without receiving credit from the state in the amount of the alleged
overcharges.
Defendant state officials appeared specially and moved to quash
service of summons upon them on the ground that the statutory venue80
for such an action against them must be in Franklin County. Plaintiff
contended that jurisdiction over the persons of defendant state officials
"' § 2309.02 (A) Petion (B) Demurrer thereto (C) Answer (D) Demurrer
thereto (E) Reply (F) Demurrer thereto.
'For an example, see Plater v. Jefferson, 136 N.E. 2d 111 (Ohio App. 1956), dis-
cussed in this Survey at page 265.
'99 Ohio App. 542, 135 N.E. 2d 484 (1954)
iWinnard v. Winnard, 62 Ohio App. 351, 23 N.E. 2d 977 (1939).
8'Omno REV. CODE § 2307.35: "Actions for the following causes must be brought
in the county where the cause of action or part thereof arose; "(B) Against a
public officer, for an act done by ha in virtue or under color of his office, or for
neglect of his official duty. "
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had been obtained 'by virtue of their being codefendants with the men-
tioned county officers properly summoned and served in Fulton County,
by vi.tue of Revised Code section 2703.04.81
The Supreme Court upheld the action of the common pleas court in
quashing service of summons. It held -that the cause of action against
the state officials arose in Franklin County, as that was the county where
their official duties were carried on.
The mere presentation of a statement of claim by a state officer to
a public officer of a county for the payment of a claimed debt against
the county under an appropriate statute does not constitute a breach
of official duty giving rise to a cause of action against the officer within
the county to which the demand is sent. We are not dealing with a
situation where a state officer is bringing suit against a county or county
officer to collect a claimed debt from the county.'
Therefore, reasoned the court, since the cause of action arose in
Franklin County, it had to be brought there. Section 2703.04, providing
for summons to issue to any other county against one or more defendants
when an action is once rightly brought, could not apply. The require-
ments of section 2307.35 confer an absolute right on the state official, of
which he may not be deprived.83 Section 2307.35 'is a special statute,
applying to public officers and has application in this case, whereas
section 2703.04 "is general in its scope and has no application where a
defendant is a public officer and 'is sued as such."84
Judges Bell and Matthias dissented, holding 'that "the propriety of the
joinder depends entirely on whether plaintiff can make a case against the
local officials; if he cannot, then the case is properly dismissed as to the
state officials."8 5
With them the author agrees and begs leave to make -two more points:
(1) if the wrongful collection by the state officials is the gist of the
cause of action, then it would seem that the wrongful payment by -the
county officials was equally necessary to perfect such a cause, and that
took place in Fulton County (certainly there are not separate causes of
action for the payment and collection), and (2) section 2703.04, pro-
viding for summons issued to another county once action is rightly
brought, provides that this may be done when it is rightly brought
' "When the action is rightly brought in any county, according to sections 2307.32
to 2307.40, inclusive, of the Revised Code, a summons may be issued to any other
county against one or more of the defendants as the plaintiffs request. "
"State ex rel. Barber v. Rhodes, 165 Ohio St. 414,421 136 N.E. 2d 60,65 (1956).
'The court intimated that he could waive it "without affecting the jurisdiction" (of
the subject matter?) 165 Ohio St. 414, 419, 136 N.E.2d 60, 64 (1956).
" State exrel. Barber v. Rhodes, 165 Ohio St. 414, 421, 136 N.E. 2d 60, 65 (1956).
MId. at 422, 136 N.E.2d at 65.
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according to sections 2307.32 to 2307A0, inclusive. Section 2307.35, on
which the defendants and the majority of the court relied, falls some-
where in between 2307.32 and 2307A0, inclusive. To this writer the
decision appears to be as far out of line as that in Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. v. Hollenberger.86 The result is to make this cause of action almost
as "local" as were all causes at early common law, and to put an almost
jurisdictional aspect on a venue matter.
Other Procedural Matters
In order that this portion of the Survey may not run to excessive
lengths, the following brief resume of other noteworthy cases is given, in
the hope -that if any item catches the reader's eye and deals with a prob-
lem which he faces, he may find a helpful authority.
1. While a general demurrer searches the -record, upon demurrer
-to an amended petition it does not search back to defects in the original
petition, since that is deemed abandoned by the filing of the amended
pleading.87
2. While a nonresident who is induced by fraud or artifice to come
within the jurisdiction of the court is usually entitled to have service of
process upon him in civil actions, made while he is still in the jurisdiction,
set aside, not all inducements to enter are necessarily fraudulent. An inter-
esting fact situation in which the motion of a defendant served under such
circumstances was denied is found in Guzzetta v. Guzzetta.8
3. While there is no rule day in an action for divorce, the right of a
defendant to file a cross-petition for divorce at trial is one which rests in
the sound discretion of the court. It was held in Sharkey v. Sbarkeys9
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the defendant
leave to do so.
4. A judgment for plaintiff in an action for personal injuries sus-
tained by him could not be sustained when only eight of the une jurors
who signed the general verdict for him had also signed a special find-
ing as to defendant's negligence, even -though a total of eleven jurors
had signed the special finding. At least nine of the same jurors who
agreed to the Tequested finding of fact finding the defendant guilty of
negligence, must agree to and sign the general verdict.20
76 Ohio S. 179 81 N.E. 184 (1907) See 11 OIo ST. L. J. 291 (1950).
'Ross v. Cincinnati Transit Co., 136 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio App. 1956).
83137 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio App. 1955).
137 N.E. 2d 575 (Ohio App. 1955).
*'Plaster v. Akron Union Passenger Co., 137 N.E. 2d 624 (Ohio App. 1955).
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